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Keywords:
stochastic games; optimal control; potential approach; dynamic programming
stochastic games; optimal control; potential approach; dynamic programming
Summary:
In this paper, we study the problem of finding deterministic (also known as feedback or closed-loop) Markov Nash equilibria for a class of discrete-time stochastic games. In order to establish our results, we develop a potential game approach based on the dynamic programming technique. The identified potential stochastic games have Borel state and action spaces and possibly unbounded nondifferentiable cost-per-stage functions. In particular, the team (or coordination) stochastic games and the stochastic games with an action independent transition law are covered.
References:
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