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*Mathematica Slovaca*, Vol. 53 (2003), No. 5, 467--478

Persistent URL: <http://dml.cz/dmlcz/136893>

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## ON DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS OF SEQUENCES GENERATED BY SCALAR AND MIXED PRODUCT

OTO STRAUCH

(Communicated by Stanislav Jakubec)

**ABSTRACT.** We study two types of real sequences: Firstly, the sequence of scalar products  $\mathbf{b}_n \cdot \mathbf{x}_n$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots$ , where  $\mathbf{b}_n$ ,  $\mathbf{x}_n$  are statistically independent and uniformly distributed in  $[0, 1]^3$ . Secondly, the sequence of absolute values of mixed products  $|(\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)} \times \mathbf{b}_n^{(2)}) \cdot \mathbf{x}_n|$ , where  $\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)}$ ,  $\mathbf{b}_n^{(2)}$ ,  $\mathbf{x}_n$ , are statistically independent and uniformly distributed in the 3-dimensional ball  $B(r)$  with the center  $(0, 0, 0)$  and radius  $r$ . We compute their asymptotic distribution functions and then we modify one-time pad cipher by using these distribution functions. All basic problems are formulated for  $s$ -dimensional sequences.

### 1. Introduction

For a given continuous real function  $f(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x})$ , we can study a real sequence of the form  $f(\mathbf{b}_n, \mathbf{x}_n)$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots$ , where  $\mathbf{b}_n$  and  $\mathbf{x}_n$  are statistically independent and uniformly distributed (briefly u.d.) sequences of  $s$ -dimensional vectors in a Jordan-measurable bounded subset  $K$  of  $\mathbb{R}^s$  with positive Lebesgue measure  $|K|$ . Its asymptotic distribution function (briefly a.d.f.) is defined by

$$g(t) = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\#\{n \leq N : f(\mathbf{b}_n, \mathbf{x}_n) < t\}}{N},$$

where  $t \in [A_0, B_0]$ , and  $A_0 = \min_{(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x}) \in K^2} f(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x})$  and  $B_0 = \max_{(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x}) \in K^2} f(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x})$ . This distribution function (briefly d.f.) can be computed using relation

$$g(t) = \frac{|\{(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x}) \in K^2 : f(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x}) < t\}|}{|K|^2}.$$

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2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 11K31, 94A60.

Keywords: sequence, uniform distribution, statistically independent sequences, distribution function, cipher, scalar product, mixed product.

This research was supported by INNA, Ltd. (Prague) and by the Slovak Academy of Sciences Grant 2/1130/21.

We can express the a.d.f. of a sequence  $f(\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)}, \mathbf{b}_n^{(2)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}_n)$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots$ , with statistically independent and u.d. sequences  $\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)}, \mathbf{b}_n^{(2)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}_n$  in  $K$  in a similar way. Note that u.d. and statistical independence of  $\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)}, \mathbf{b}_n^{(2)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}_n$  in  $K$  is equivalent to the u.d. of  $(\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)}, \mathbf{b}_n^{(2)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}_n)$  in  $K^s$ . For exact definitions and basic properties of u.d. sequences and a.d.f.'s, see the monograph [DT].

Our study is motivated by a new application of the theory of u.d. in cryptology,<sup>1</sup> which is based on the following method for computing of the key sequence in a one-time pad type cipher:

$$x_n = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for } f(\mathbf{b}_n, \mathbf{x}_n) \in [A, B), \\ 0 & \text{for } f(\mathbf{b}_n, \mathbf{x}_n) \notin [A, B), \end{cases}$$

where  $\mathbf{b}_n$  is the secret,  $\mathbf{x}_n$  is random and the interval  $[A, B)$  satisfies  $g(B) - g(A) = \frac{1}{2}$ .

Part 2 of this paper is devoted to the study of a.d.f.  $g(t)$  of the sequence  $f(\mathbf{b}_n, \mathbf{x}_n)$ , where  $f$  is defined by the scalar product  $f(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{b} \cdot \mathbf{x}$  and  $K = [0, 1]^s$ . For  $s = 1, 2, 3$  and  $t \in [0, 1]$  we will compute  $g(t)$  explicitly.

In Part 3 we study a.d.f.  $g(t)$  of the sequence  $f(\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)}, \mathbf{b}_n^{(2)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}_n)$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots$ , where  $f$  is defined by absolute value of the mixed product (i.e. the determinant)

$$f(\mathbf{b}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}) = |\det(\mathbf{b}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x})|,$$

where the vectors belong to the ball  $K = B(r)$  in  $\mathbb{R}^s$  with center  $(0, \dots, 0)$  and radius  $r$ . We give  $g(t)$  explicitly, for  $s = 1, 2, 3$ .

In Part 4 we describe a modification of one-time pad cipher, having private vector sequence  $\mathbf{b}_n$  and matrix sequence  $\mathbf{A}_n$ . Contrary to the classical one-time pad, in this case,  $\mathbf{b}_n, \mathbf{A}_n$  can be securely applied many times. In Part 5 some other modifications are also given. A cryptanalysis of such modifications will be discussed in a forthcoming paper.

## 2. Sequence of scalar products of vectors in cubes

Define

$$g_s(t) = |\{(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x}) \in [0, 1]^{2s} : \mathbf{b} \cdot \mathbf{x} < t\}|, \quad t \in [0, s].$$

For  $s = 1$  we have

$$g_1(t) = t - t \log t, \quad t \in [0, 1],$$

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<sup>1</sup>This paper has been presented during Journées Tchéco-Slovaco-Francaises, Saint-Etienne, April 4–5, 2002; and TATRACRYPT 2003, Bratislava, June 26–28, 2003.

with the density  $g'_1(t) = -\log t$ . The  $g_s(t)$  is an a.d.f. of the sequence

$$\mathbf{b}_n \cdot \mathbf{x}_n = \sum_{i=1}^s b_{n,i} x_{n,i}, \quad n = 1, 2, \dots,$$

where  $\mathbf{b}_n = (b_{n,1}, \dots, b_{n,s})$  and  $\mathbf{x}_n = (x_{n,1}, \dots, x_{n,s})$  are statistically independent and u.d. in  $[0, 1]^s$ . Since the  $s$ -dimensional sequence

$$(b_{n,1}x_{n,1}, \dots, b_{n,s}x_{n,s})$$

also has statistically independent coordinates, it has a.d.f.  $g(\mathbf{t})$ ,  $\mathbf{t} = (t_1, \dots, t_s)$ , of the form

$$g(\mathbf{t}) = (t_1 - t_1 \log t_1) \cdots (t_s - t_s \log t_s)$$

which gives

$$g_s(t) = (-1)^s \int_{\substack{t_1 + \dots + t_s = t \\ 0 \leq t_1 \leq 1, \dots, 0 \leq t_s \leq 1}} 1 \cdot \log t_1 \cdots \log t_s dt_1 \cdots dt_s.$$

In particular, for any decomposition  $S_1 \cup S_2 = \{1, \dots, s\}$ , the coordinates of the sequence

$$\left( \sum_{i \in S_1} b_{n,i} x_{n,i}, \sum_{i \in S_2} b_{n,i} x_{n,i} \right)$$

are also statistically independent. Thus

$$g_s(t) = \int_{x+y < t} 1 \cdot dg_j(x) dg_{s-j}(y)$$

and the Fig. 1




FIGURE 1.

implies that

$$g_s(t) = \begin{cases} \int_0^t dg_j(x) \int_0^{t-x} dg_{s-j}(y) & \text{for } t \in [0, j], \\ \int_0^j dg_j(x) \int_0^{t-x} dg_{s-j}(y) & \text{for } t \in [j, s-j], \\ \int_0^{t-s+j} dg_j(x) + \int_{t-s+j}^j dg_j(x) \int_0^{t-x} dg_{s-j}(y) & \text{for } t \in [s-j, s] \end{cases}$$

for  $j \leq s - j$ . Its densities are

$$g'_s(t) = \begin{cases} \int_0^t g'_j(x) g'_{s-j}(t-x) dx & \text{for } t \in [0, j], \\ \int_0^j g'_j(x) g'_{s-j}(t-x) dx & \text{for } t \in [j, s-j], \\ \int_{t-s+j}^j g'_j(x) g'_{s-j}(t-x) dx & \text{for } t \in [s-j, s]. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Applying (1) we find:

**THEOREM 1.** For  $t \in [0, 1]$ ,

$$g_2(t) = \frac{t^2}{2} \left( (\log t)^2 - 3 \log t + \frac{7}{2} - \frac{1}{6} \pi^2 \right),$$

$$g_3(t) = \frac{t^3}{27} \left( -\frac{9}{2} (\log t)^3 + \frac{99}{4} (\log t)^2 + \left( -\frac{255}{4} + \frac{9}{4} \pi^2 \right) \log t + \frac{575}{8} - \frac{33}{8} \pi^2 - 9\zeta(3) \right),$$

where  $\zeta(s)$  is the classical Riemann's zeta function.

Applying substitution  $x_i = \frac{t_i}{t}$ ,  $i = 1, 2, \dots, s$ , for  $t \in (0, 1)$ , L. Habsieger (Bordeaux) found (personal communication) that

$$\begin{aligned} g_s(t) &= (-1)^s t^s \int_{\substack{x_1 + \dots + x_s < 1 \\ 0 \leq x_1 < 1, \dots, 0 \leq x_s < 1}} (\log t + \log x_1) \cdots (\log t + \log x_s) dx_1 \cdots dx_s \\ &= (-1)^s t^s \sum_{j=0}^s \binom{s}{j} (\log t)^{s-j} \tilde{g}_j, \end{aligned}$$

and then using substitution  $x_1 + \dots + x_j = 1 - y_1 \cdots y_j$ , he found

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{g}_j &= \int_{\substack{x_1 + \dots + x_s < 1 \\ 0 \leq x_1 < 1, \dots, 0 \leq x_s < 1}} \log x_1 \cdots \log x_j dx_1 \cdots dx_j \\ &= \frac{1}{(s-j)!} \int_{[0,1]^j} \prod_{i=1}^j (\log y_1 + \dots + \log y_{j-1} + \log(1 - y_j)) y_1^{s-1} \cdots y_j^{s-j} dy_1 \cdots dy_j. \end{aligned}$$

He also observed that  $\tilde{g}_j$  is a composition of integrals

$$\int_0^1 (\log x)^m x^n dx = \frac{(-1)^m m!}{(n+1)^{m+1}},$$

$$\int_0^1 (\log x)^m x^n \log(1-x) dx = (-1)^{m+1} m! \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{k(k+n+1)^{m+1}}$$

$$= a_0 + a_1 \zeta(2) + \dots + a_m \zeta(m+1) \quad \text{for some } a_i \in \mathbb{Q}.$$

**Remark 1.** The explicit form of  $g_s(t)$ , for  $t \in [1, s]$ , is open even for  $s = 2, 3$ .

### 3. Sequences of mixed products of vectors in balls

Let  $K = B(r)$  be the  $s$ -dimensional ball with center  $(0, \dots, 0)$  and radius  $r$ . Consider the d.f.

$$g_s(r, t) = \frac{|\{(\mathbf{b}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}) \in B^s(r) : |\det(\mathbf{b}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x})| < t\}|}{|B(r)|^s}$$

for  $t \in [0, r^s]$ . It can be seen that for

$$\lambda = \frac{t}{r^s}$$

there exists d.f.  $\tilde{g}_s(\lambda)$  such that

$$g_s(r, t) = \tilde{g}_s(\lambda), \quad \lambda \in [0, 1].$$

The d.f.  $\tilde{g}_s(\lambda)$  can be found directly from the definition and also via the following application of Crofton's theorem (cf. [KM; pp. 25–27]): Let

$$g_s^*(r, t) = \frac{|\{(\mathbf{b}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}^{(s-1)}) \in B^{s-1}(r) : |\mathbf{x}| = r, \mathbf{x} \text{ — fixed}, |\det(\mathbf{b}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x})| < t\}|}{|B(r)|^{s-1}},$$

where  $|\mathbf{x}|$  is the norm of  $\mathbf{x}$ . Then the d.f.  $g_s(r, t)$  and  $g_s^*(r, t)$  satisfy

$$\frac{dg_s(r, t)}{dr} = s(g_s^*(r, t) - g_s(r, t)) \frac{d|B(r)|}{dr} \frac{1}{|B(r)|}. \tag{2}$$

Using these two methods we find:

**THEOREM 2.** For  $\lambda \in [0, 1]$  we have

$$\tilde{g}_2(\lambda) = \frac{2}{\pi}(1 + 2\lambda^2) \arcsin \lambda + \frac{6}{\pi}\lambda\sqrt{1 - \lambda^2} - 2\lambda^2,$$

$$\tilde{g}_3(\lambda) = 1 + \frac{9}{4}\lambda \int_{\lambda}^1 \frac{\arccos x}{x} dx - \frac{3}{4}\lambda^3 \arccos \lambda - \sqrt{1 - \lambda^2} + \frac{7}{4}\lambda^2\sqrt{1 - \lambda^2},$$

where the final integral cannot be expressed in the form of a finite combination of elementary functions.<sup>2</sup>

**P r o o f.**

For  $\tilde{g}_2(\lambda)$ : Put

$$\mathbf{b} = (b \cos \beta, b \sin \beta) = (b_1, b_2),$$

$$\mathbf{x} = (x \cos \alpha, x \sin \alpha).$$

Then

$$|\det(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x})| = |bx \sin(\alpha - \beta)|.$$

Putting  $x = r$  and  $\alpha = 0$  we have

$$|\det(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x})| < t \iff |b_2| < \frac{t}{r}.$$

Thus

$$g_2^*(r, t) = \frac{|\{\mathbf{b} \in B(r) : |b_2| < t/r\}|}{\pi r^2}$$

which gives

$$g_2^*(r, t) = \frac{2}{\pi} \arcsin\left(\frac{t}{r^2}\right) + \frac{2}{\pi} \left(\frac{t}{r^2}\right) \sqrt{1 - \left(\frac{t}{r^2}\right)^2}.$$

Solving the differential equation (2) we find the desired d.f.  $\tilde{g}_2(\lambda)$ .

For  $\tilde{g}_3(\lambda)$ : The direct proof is divided into the following steps.

(a) Let  $|\mathbf{u}_0| = r^2$  (the Euclidean norm), then

$$|\mathbf{u}_0 \cdot \mathbf{z}| = \left| |\mathbf{u}_0| \frac{\mathbf{u}_0}{|\mathbf{u}_0|} \cdot \mathbf{z} \right| < t \iff \left| \frac{\mathbf{u}_0}{|\mathbf{u}_0|} \cdot \mathbf{z} \right| < \frac{t}{|\mathbf{u}_0|} = \frac{t}{r^2}$$

and for the measure we get

$$|\{|\mathbf{z}| \leq r : |\mathbf{u}_0 \cdot \mathbf{z}| < t\}| = \begin{cases} 2\pi r^2 \left(\frac{t}{r^2}\right) - \frac{2}{3}\pi \left(\frac{t}{r^2}\right)^3 & \text{for } \frac{t}{r^2} \leq r, \\ \frac{4}{3}\pi r^3 & \text{for } \frac{t}{r^2} > r. \end{cases}$$

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<sup>2</sup>Cf. [RG; p. 122].

(b) Given vector  $\mathbf{u}_0$ ,  $|\mathbf{u}_0| = r^2$ , and  $\theta \in [0, 1]$ , define  $\mathbf{u} = \theta\mathbf{u}_0$ , then using (a) we get that the set  $\{|\mathbf{z}| \leq r : |\mathbf{u} \cdot \mathbf{z}| < t\}$  has the measure

$$|\{|\mathbf{z}| \leq r : |\mathbf{u}_0 \cdot \mathbf{z}| < \frac{t}{\theta}\}| = \begin{cases} 2\pi r^2 \left(\frac{t}{\theta r^2}\right) - \frac{2}{3}\pi \left(\frac{t}{\theta r^2}\right)^3 & \text{for } \frac{t}{r^3} \leq \theta, \\ \frac{4}{3}\pi r^3 & \text{for } \frac{t}{r^3} > \theta. \end{cases}$$

(c) For vectors  $\mathbf{u}_0$ ,  $|\mathbf{u}_0| = r^2$ , and  $\mathbf{x}_0$ ,  $|\mathbf{x}_0| = r$ ,  $\mathbf{u}_0 \cdot \mathbf{x}_0 = 0$ , define  $\mathbf{u} = \theta\mathbf{u}_0$  for fixed  $\theta \in [0, 1]$  and  $\mathbf{x} = \theta_1\mathbf{x}_0$  with  $\theta_1 \in [0, 1]$ . Every solution of the equation  $\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{x} \times \mathbf{y}$  such that  $|\mathbf{y}| \leq r$  has the form

$$\mathbf{y} = \frac{\mathbf{u} \times \mathbf{x}}{|\mathbf{x}|^2} + \alpha\mathbf{x},$$

where  $\alpha$  is any real number for which  $|\mathbf{y}| \leq r$ . Since

$$\left| \frac{\mathbf{u} \times \mathbf{x}}{|\mathbf{x}|^2} \right| = \frac{|\mathbf{u}|}{|\mathbf{x}|} = \frac{\theta r^2}{\theta_1 r} = \frac{\theta}{\theta_1} r,$$

and the minimum of  $(\theta r)/\theta_1$  is attained at  $\theta_1 = 1$ , it can be seen that all solutions  $\mathbf{y}$ ,  $|\mathbf{y}| \leq r$ , form a circle segment with height  $r - \theta r$  and thus

$$|\{|\mathbf{y}| \leq r : \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{x} \times \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{u} = \theta\mathbf{u}_0, \mathbf{x} = \theta_1\mathbf{x}_0, \theta_1 \in [0, 1]\}| = r^2 \left( \arccos \theta - \theta \sqrt{1 - \theta^2} \right).$$

(d) Since  $|\{\mathbf{x}_0 = r : \mathbf{u}_0 \cdot \mathbf{x}_0 = 0, \mathbf{u}_0 \text{ — fixed}\}| = 2\pi r$ , we have

$$|\{(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \in B(r) : \mathbf{x} \times \mathbf{y} = \theta\mathbf{u}_0, \mathbf{u}_0 \text{ — fixed}\}| = 2\pi r^3 \left( \arccos \theta - \theta \sqrt{1 - \theta^2} \right)$$

and putting  $|\{|\mathbf{u}_0| = r^2\}| = M$  we find that

$$g_3(r, t) = \frac{M}{\left(\frac{4}{3}\pi r^3\right)^3} \left[ \frac{4}{3}\pi r^3 \int_0^{\frac{t}{r^3}} 2\pi r^3 \left( \arccos \theta - \theta \sqrt{1 - \theta^2} \right) d\theta + \int_{\frac{t}{r^3}}^1 2\pi r^3 \left( \arccos \theta - \theta \sqrt{1 - \theta^2} \right) \left( 2\pi r^2 \left( \frac{t}{\theta r^2} \right) - \frac{2}{3}\pi \left( \frac{t}{\theta r^2} \right)^3 \right) d\theta \right].$$

Norming  $g_3(r, t) = 1$  for  $t = r^3$  we find  $M = \frac{4}{3}\pi r^3$  which gives the desired  $\tilde{g}_3(\lambda)$ . □

**Remark 2.** Note that in a direct proof for  $\tilde{g}_2(\lambda)$  the fact can be used that if the sequence  $(\mathbf{b}_n, \mathbf{x}_n)$  is u.d. in  $B(r)^2$  and

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{b}_n &= (b_n \cos \beta_n, b_n \sin \beta_n), \\ \mathbf{x}_n &= (x_n \cos \alpha_n, x_n \sin \alpha_n), \end{aligned}$$



then the coordinate sequence

$$(b_n, x_n, \beta_n, \alpha_n)$$

has a.d.f.

$$g(x, u, y, v) = \frac{x^2}{r^2} \frac{u^2}{r^2} \frac{y}{2\pi} \frac{v}{2\pi}$$

defined on  $[0, r] \times [0, r] \times [0, 2\pi] \times [0, 2\pi]$ .

**Remark 3.** For possible control of  $g_3(r, t)$  via Crofton's theorem, we have

$$g_3^*(r, t) = 1 + \frac{3}{2} \lambda \int_{\lambda}^1 \frac{\arccos x}{x} dx + \frac{3}{4} \lambda^3 \arccos \lambda - \sqrt{1 - \lambda^2} + \frac{1}{4} \lambda^2 \sqrt{1 - \lambda^2},$$

where  $\lambda = \frac{t}{r^3}$ .

**Remark 4.** As mentioned, the explicit form of  $\tilde{g}_s(\lambda)$  for  $s > 3$  is unknown. Also the form of d.f. is open if we replace  $s$ -dimensional ball  $K = B(r)$  by the unit cube  $K = [0, 1]^s$ .

#### 4. A modified one-time pad cipher

(I) Two users  $X$  and  $Y$  agree on the

- private vector sequence

$$\mathbf{b}_n, \quad n = 1, 2, \dots, N,$$

in  $K \subset \mathbb{R}^s$ ,

and

- private sequence of regular  $(s + 1) \times (s + 1)$  real matrices

$$\mathbf{A}_n, \quad n = 1, 2, \dots, N,$$

where  $N$  is sufficiently large,

and

- continuous function

$$f(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x}) \quad \text{for } \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x} \in K,$$

where the values  $f(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x})$  form an interval  $[A_0, B_0]$ .

The users compute the d.f.

$$g(t) = \frac{|\{(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x}) \in K^2 : f(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x}) < t\}|}{|K|^2} \quad \text{for } t \in [A_0, B_0]$$

and select an interval  $[A, B] \subset [A_0, B_0]$  such that

$$g(B) - g(A) = \frac{1}{2}.$$

The interval  $[A, B]$  is also private.

(II) If  $X$  wants to send a message written as 0–1 sequence (i.e. the plaintext digits)

$$u_n, \quad n = 1, 2, \dots, N,$$

to  $Y$ , he does the following steps:

- $X$  selects a random (or pseudo-random) sequence of vectors  $\mathbf{x}_n$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots, N$ , in the region  $K$ .
- $X$  computes enciphering sequence (the key digits)

$$x_n = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for } f(\mathbf{b}_n, \mathbf{x}_n) \in [A, B), \\ 0 & \text{for } f(\mathbf{b}_n, \mathbf{x}_n) \notin [A, B). \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

- $X$  enciphers  $u_n$  to the sequence (ciphertext digits)

$$y_n = u_n + x_n \pmod{2}, \quad n = 1, 2, \dots, N.$$

- $X$  mixes the sequence  $(\mathbf{x}_n, y_n)$  of  $s + 1$ -dimensional vectors by matrices  $\mathbf{A}_n$  to

$$\mathbf{z}_n^T = \mathbf{A}_n \cdot (\mathbf{x}_n, y_n)^T,$$

and then sends  $\mathbf{z}_n$  to  $Y$  through public line.

(III)  $Y$  decrypts the received ciphertext as follows:

- $Y$  decomposes  $\mathbf{z}_n$  applying formula

$$(\mathbf{x}_n, y_n) = \mathbf{A}_n^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{z}_n^T.$$

- Using  $\mathbf{x}_n$  he computes  $x_n$  in the same manner as  $X$ .
- He finds the plaintext digits

$$u_n = y_n + x_n \pmod{2}, \quad n = 1, 2, \dots, N.$$

**Remark 5.** In the classical one-time pad cipher (i.e. Vernam cipher, cf. [MvV; Chap. 6]), two users  $X$  and  $Y$  have a common private 0–1 key sequence  $x_n$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots, N$ , and  $X$  sends the 0–1 plaintext sequence  $u_n$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots, N$ , to  $Y$  as ciphertext sequence  $y_n = u_n + x_n \pmod{2}$ . If  $u_n$  is disclosed, and since  $y_n$  through public line, the key sequence  $x_n$  is also disclosed. Thus a secure application of  $x_n$  is only one time. Now, assume that

- $\mathbf{A}_n$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots, N$ ,
- $u_n$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots, N$ ,
- $[A, B)$

are disclosed. Then (since  $\mathbf{z}_n$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots, N$ , through public line)  $\mathbf{x}_n$  and  $x_n$  also are disclosed, and for secret  $\mathbf{b}_n$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots$ , we have only

$$\mathbf{b}_n \in f^{-1}([A, B], \mathbf{x}_n) \quad \text{or} \quad \mathbf{b}_n \notin f^{-1}([A, B], \mathbf{x}_n),$$

where  $f^{-1}(I, \mathbf{x}) = \{\mathbf{b} \in K : f(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{x}) \in I\}$ . Therefore  $\mathbf{b}_n$  can be used several times. The detail security analysis will be investigated in our forthcoming paper. For the quality of the key sequence  $x_n$  we only note that any given 0–1 u.d. sequence  $x_n$  can be constructed by (3) using suitable u.d.  $\mathbf{b}_n$  and  $\mathbf{x}_n$ .

### 5. Other modifications

(A) The cryptosystem of Part 4 can be modified taking a function  $f(\mathbf{b}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x})$  and vector sequence  $(\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}_n)$  in  $K^s$ , where

- $(\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^{(s-1)})$  is a common secret sequence for both users  $X$  and  $Y$ ;
- $\mathbf{x}_n$  is a random choice sequence for  $X$ ;
- The enciphering sequence is computed by

$$x_n = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for } f(\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}_n) \in [A, B], \\ 0 & \text{for } f(\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}_n) \notin [A, B], \end{cases}$$

where  $g(B) - g(A) = \frac{1}{2}$  and

$$g(t) = \frac{|\{(\mathbf{b}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}) \in K^s : f(\mathbf{b}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}^{(s-1)}, \mathbf{x}) < t\}|}{|K^s|}.$$

Note that the function  $f$  involving determinant as in Part 3, can be used.

(B) A further modification of one-time pad is as follows:

- The users  $X$  and  $Y$  have a common secret sequence

$$(\mathbf{b}_n^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^{(s-2)}), \quad n = 1, 2, \dots$$

Before the encryption of a message, users  $X$  and  $Y$  exchange through public line two sequences  $\mathbf{x}_n$  and  $\mathbf{y}_n$  computed as follows:

- $X$  selects  $\mathbf{x}_n^{(s-1)}$  randomly;
- $Y$  selects  $\mathbf{x}_n^{(s)}$  randomly;
- $X$  sends to  $Y$  through public line a sequence of vectors

$$\mathbf{x}_n = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{i}_1 & \dots & \mathbf{i}_s \\ b_{n,1}^{(1)} & \dots & b_{n,s}^{(1)} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ b_{n,1}^{(s-2)} & \dots & b_{n,s}^{(s-2)} \\ x_{n,1}^{(s-1)} & \dots & x_{n,s}^{(s-1)} \end{pmatrix},$$

where  $\mathbf{i}_1, \mathbf{i}_2, \dots, \mathbf{i}_s$  are  $s$ -dimensional unit vectors and  $\mathbf{b}_n^{(i)} = (b_{n,1}^{(i)}, b_{n,2}^{(i)}, \dots, b_{n,s}^{(i)})$ ;

- $Y$  sends to  $X$  through public line the sequence

$$\mathbf{y}_n = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{i}_1 & \dots & \mathbf{i}_s \\ b_{n,1}^{(1)} & \dots & b_{n,s}^{(1)} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ b_{n,1}^{(s-2)} & \dots & b_{n,s}^{(s-2)} \\ x_{n,1}^{(s)} & \dots & x_{n,s}^{(s)} \end{pmatrix};$$

- $X$  and  $Y$  compute the common sequence of absolute values of scalar products

$$v_n = |\mathbf{x}_n \cdot \mathbf{x}_n^{(s)}| = |\mathbf{y}_n \cdot \mathbf{x}_n^{(s-1)}|;$$

- $X$  and  $Y$  compute the key sequence  $x_n$  by

$$x_n = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for } v_n \in [A, B), \\ 0 & \text{for } v_n \notin [A, B), \end{cases}$$

where  $g(B) - g(A) = \frac{1}{2}$  and  $g(t) = g_s(r, t)$  as in Part 3.

It can be proved that this method is equivalent to the method of Part 4 with scalar product, without scrambling matrices and having  $s^2$ -dimensional vectors.

(C) In all of the above modifications, the intervals  $[A, B)$  can also be replaced by  $m$  non-overlapping intervals  $[A_i, B_i)$ ,  $i = 1, 2, \dots, m$ , satisfying

$$\sum_{i=1}^m g(B_i) - g(A_i) = \frac{1}{2}.$$

## 6. Acknowledgement

The author expresses many thanks INNA Ltd. (Prague), especially F. Krincvaj and I. Trtik, for their assistance at the implementation of the cryptosystem described in Part 4 and based on  $g_3(t)$ .

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Received September 5, 2003

Revised October 2, 2003

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